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Abstract
This paper aims to examine the financing options of the managers/owners of SMEs (small and medium-
sized companies) from a point of view that incorporates cultural values, namely, conservatism and secrecy.
Data were collected with the use of a questionnaire conducted for managers/owners of a sample of 1629
Portuguese SMEs, and with the use of accounting and financial information from the period 2009 to 2011.
438 managers/owners provided valid answers, corresponding to a response rate of 27%. Using multivariate
regression techniques as a basis, the results showed that a significant number of managers/owners supported
the negative relationship between conservatism/secrecy and the business financing options associated with
a higher risk (debts with costs). The results also showed that a more significant number of managers/owners
of national SMEs choose sources of financing in light of the pecking order theory.
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Resumen
El presente articulo tiene como objetivo examinar las opciones de financiamiento de los administradores
y propietarios de las Pymes incorporando en el analisis los valores culturales relacionados con el conser-
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vadurismo y el secreto. Los datos fueron recogidos mediante un cuestionario realizado a los administradores
y propietarios de una muestra de 1,629 pymes lideres en Portugal. Tambien se analizó la información con-
table y financiera entre los ejercicios 2009 a 2011, habiendo obtenido 438 respuestas, lo que supone un 27%,
que valida la misma. Basado en técnicas de regresión multivariante, los resultados muestran una correlacion
negativa entre el conservadurismo y el secreto, analizados en conjunto, y las opciones de financiamiento de
las empresas relacionadas con un mayor riesgo, o sea, una financiamiento con costos. También se verifica
una correlacion entre la selección de las fuentes de financiamiento de las Pymes a la luz de la teoría de
jerarquía de las preferencias de capital.
© 2016 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Facultad de Contaduría y Administración. Este es un
artículo Open Access bajo la licencia CC BY-NC-ND (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Introduction
Studies related to capital structure theories have mainly used the theoretical contributions that
are usually mentioned in the context of corporate finance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Modigliani
& Miller, 1958, 1963; Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984).
Recent theoretical developments have used new variables in order to explain corporate finan-
cing, such as the effects of the motivational and cultural factors. Even though there is a large
number of existing empirical studies that are based on theories that explain the capital structure
of the entities, there is still a small number of studies that explain the motivational factors that
underlie the cultural values and the indices of cultural dimensions. These studies aim to explain
the capital structure of the companies of the countries under review (Antonczyk & Salzmann,
2014; Antonczyk, Breuer, & Salzmann, 2010, 2011; Chui, Lloyd, & Kwok, 2002; Fairbairn,
2013; Gleason, Mathur, & Mathur, 2000; Hilgen, 2014; Mac an Bhard & Lucey, 2014; Poker
Junior, Belli, & Milani Filho, 2015; Rihab & Lofti, 2011; Wang & Esqueda, 2014) by using the
indices of cultural values of such countries, namely the indices of cultural values proposed by
Hofstede (1980) and Schwartz (1994, 1999).
This paper aims to identify the existence of the relationship between two cultural values
proposed by the literature on this subject (namely conservatism and secrecy) and the corporate
financing options of the managers and/or owners of Portuguese SMEs, based on the Commis-
sion Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003. The level of identification with the above
mentioned values was determined using a questionnaire. The questions in this questionnaire are
related to management and corporate financing and discuss the factors behind the aversion of the
SMEs to obtain financing based on the public and private equity. In this sense, conservatism  is
present when the entity adopts conservative accounting and management practices (e.g. choosing
the cost model rather than the fair value model), uses accounting practices that are more in line
with the objectives of taxation or is concerned about opening the capital to elements outside the
traditional structure of the entity. Secrecy, in turn, is present when the entity strongly resists dis-
closing information, namely by resorting to less traditional sources of financing which require the
entity to disclose more significant information. Unfortunately, said entities (especially the more
secretive entities) are not always willing to provide such information.
The model adopted in this study is also in line with the theoretical developments related to
the hierarchy of sources of financing mentioned by Myers (1984) in the pecking order theory,
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and mentioned by Barton and Gordon (1987) in their contributions regarding motivational factors
such as risk aversion and business strategy. The importance of SMEs in the European economy
(which constitute the majority of businesses) and the specific characteristics of the SMEs (which
frequently fail to use the same sources of fundraising as the larger companies) help us to create a
differentiated analysis of the factors that determine the capital structure (Berger & Udell, 1998).
The European Commission has been recently concerned about the sources of financing available
to the SMEs in the context of the financial and economic crisis some countries are currently
facing.
Hall, Hutchinson, and Michaelas (2004) concluded in his multi-country study conducted in
Europe that both the capital structure of the European companies (SMEs) and the factors that
determine it have significant variations that cannot be overlooked. They suggest that there are
“differences in attitudes, disclosure requirements, relationships with banks, tax differences and
other economic, social and cultural differences” that may be the basis of these differences. For
us, “new researches may further explain the country-specific variables that determine the capital
structure of the SMEs”.
Another factor of interest about this paper is its analysis of debt. It takes into account its more
specific characteristic – debt with costs and debt without costs – which is much overlooked in
the literature on this subject. This study also differs from the others in that it uses information
that was collected not just from the questionnaire or the financial reports of the entities but from
both. This way we avoid using indices of cultural values that were already used and developed
in other studies (such as Hofstede’s [1980] and Schwartz’s [1994] indices), and that, despite its
subjective factors, may not be able to capture every relevant effect associated with the variable
that is intended to be used as an independent variable (Baskerville, 2003).
Theoretical  framework
Studies related to the theories of corporate finance have tried to explain the structure of business
financing and the choices made by managers and owners regarding the available sources of
financing. These studies include analyses on the optimal capital structure, which take into account
the theoretical developments proposed by Modigliani and Miller (1963), which include the theory
of immunization, taxation analyses, bankruptcy costs (trade-off), the pecking order theory and
agency problems, as well as issues related to signalling and information asymmetries (Berger
& Udell, 1998; Brealey & Myers, 1998; DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980; Jensen, 1986; Jensen &
Meckling, 1976; Kim, 1978; Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973; Leland & Pyle, 1977; Miller, 1977;
Myers, 1977, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984; Ross, 1977; Scott, 1976; Stulz, 1990; Stadler &
Castilho, 1997).
Theories related to immunization, taxation, and bankruptcy costs (Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973;
Modigliani & Miller, 1963; Ross, 1977; Scott, 1976) focus on the determination of an optimal
capital structure through the application of fundamentally rational criteria to the decisions of the
economic agents.
The agency costs theory focuses on the complexity of the relationship between the corporate
structure and its various actors, namely the managers, owners of capital and creditors. This rela-
tionship may lead to conflicts that have an impact on the value of the company, i.e., that may
affect the company’s investment and financing decisions (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). It has very
different effects depending on the governance structure of the societies. The pecking order theory,
initially developed by Myers and Majluf (1984) and later complemented by Myers (1984), fits
in this context. It states that the company must choose one type of financing over another, i.e.,
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it hierarchizes the available sources of financing. This theory is known for applying other crite-
ria besides strictly rational criteria to the financing decisions that do not arise from the agency
problems highlighted by Jensen and Meckling (1976).
Theories based on the effects of information asymmetry are related to the process of possession
and provision of information and to the process of quality perception of the provided information
from the perspective of the entities that need financing or that finance, and from the perspective of
the managers and capital holders who affect the debt maturity (Diamond, 1991; Harris & Raviv,
1991; Leland & Pyle, 1977; Ross, 1977).
Other studies have also associated previous contributions with the explanation of capital struc-
ture, based on the life cycle of the companies and the different financing needs throughout the
different stages (Ang, 1991; Berger & Udell, 1998; Churchill & Lewis, 1983; Gibb & Davies,
1990; Scott & Bruce, 1987).
Recent theoretical developments have focused on the subjective factors associated with finan-
cing options. These factors have been analyzed in the context of behavioural finance and
competitive strategies (Ang, 1991; Berger & Udell, 1998; Churchill & Lewis, 1983; Gibb &
Davies, 1990; Scott & Bruce, 1987). These contributions can relate to Barton and Gordon’s work
(1987), in that subjective and motivational factors are determined from a strategic perspective, and
to the pecking order theory initiated by Myers (1984), in that the preferred sources of corporate
financing are also taken into account.
Other theoretical developments analyze the influence of the national culture in the determi-
nation of the capital structure, the financing options of the companies and the debt maturity
(Antonczyk & Salzmann, 2014; Antonczyk et al., 2010, 2011; Chui et al., 2002; Fairbairn, 2013;
Gleason et al., 2000; Hilgen, 2014; Mac an Bhard & Lucey, 2014; Poker Junior et al., 2015; Rihab
& Lofti, 2011). Furthermore, these studies use variables that are related to the cultural dimensions
proposed by Hofstede (1980) and Schwartz (1992, 1994). The results of these studies were quite
satisfactory. The results showed that researchers must not overlook cognitive factors (such as
culture) when explaining the companies’ behaviour towards financing decisions. These results
also suggest that it is necessary to conduct studies in every country using analyses that go beyond
the traditional approach of dividing the countries according to pre-established classifications, e.g.
dividing the countries based on the Anglo-Saxon axis (Antonczyk & Salzmann, 2014; Antonczyk
et al., 2010, 2011; Chang, Wee, & Yi, 2012; Chui et al., 2002; Fairbairn, 2013; Gleason et al.,
2000; Hilgen, 2014; Kearney, Mac an Bhaird, & Lucey, 2012; Mac an Bhaird and Lucey, 2014;
Rihab & Lofti, 2011; Wang & Esqueda, 2014; Zheng, El Ghoul, Guedhami, & Kwok, 2012).
These studies highlight the negative relationship between the level of debt and the cultural
dimensions associated with risk aversion and/or conservatism, proposed by Hofstede (1980) and
Schwartz (1994) respectively. These cultural dimensions were evidenced using, for instance, the
results obtained by Mac an Bhaird and Lucey (2014), Chui et al. (2002) and Gleason et al.
(2000) regarding total debts, and the results obtained by Kearney et al. (2012), Mac an Bhaird
and Lucey (2014) and Zheng et al. (2012) regarding long-term debts. Kearney and Zheng do
not agree with the restrictions considered by Chang et al. (2012). In fact, in the context of the
relationship between risk aversion and debt, Kearney et al. (2012) emphasize that “SME owners
wish to avoid high business risks by reducing the interference from creditors and keeping their
autonomy and independence”, in which are corroborated by Mac an Bhaird and Lucey (2014)
who mention the “SME owners’ desire to avoid heightened business risk, and interference from
debt providers”. Those authors, in particular, have found that the effects of cross-country dif-
ferences “are generally stronger than firm-characteristic, industry or institutional effects”. They
also disagree with the results obtained by Chang et al. (2012) seeing as, in the context of SMEs,
F. Albuquerque et al. / Contaduría y Administración 62 (2017) 279–298 283
they believe that medium and long term debts pose a higher risk to the owners than short term
debts.
In summary, although studies on the inclusion of culture as a factor that explains the social
phenomena have received a major boost due to the work carried out by Hofstede (1980), the
investigation of this element in the context of corporate finance only started receiving more
attention at the beginning of the 21st century, which is clear from the studies published since then,
generally with quite satisfactory results. Taking into account the results achieved, it is expected
that the investigation will eventually continue and that it will focus on reviewing the criteria
that underlie the inclusion of variables related to cultural dimensions. However, the majority of
these studies have adopted a multi-country approach in an attempt to identify cultural differences
between various countries, using the scores of cultural values developed by one of the authors
mentioned above.
In the context of the literature on the capital structure, the specific characteristics of the SMEs
have often been highlighted, along with the difficulties and barriers in accessing finance and any
other issues related to information asymmetry. In this context, these are all recurring themes (Ang,
Cole, & Lin, 2000; Bruns & Fletcher, 2008; Fairbairn, 2013; Hall et al., 2004; Hussain, Millman,
& Matlay, 2006; Jordan, Lowe, & Taylor, 1998; Lopez-Gracia & Aybar-Arias, 2000; Mac an
Bhaird and Lucey, 2014; Moro, Lucas, Grimm, & Grassi, 2010; Schmitt, 2002; Sogorb-Mira &
Lopez-Gracia, 2003; Watson & Wilson, 2002).
Methodology
This section of the paper presents the dataset that was used and some theoretical arguments
that explain why certain variables and hypothesis were used in this study.
Annex 1 provides the questions (Q) of the questionnaire launched, which was used as proxies
for the variables presented in this paper.
The  hypothesis  proposed  for  this  study  determined  that  the  level  and  characteristics  of  the
SMEs’ debts  were  inﬂuenced  by  cultural  factors  (such  as  conservatism  and  secrecy)  and  by  the
elements usually  mentioned  in  the  theories  related  to  the  capital  structure.
In addition to identifying the elements that are usually taken into account in the literature on
the capital structure, this hypothesis presents the factors that are evidence of a higher or lower
level of conservatism or secrecy and associates said factors with the cultural values analyzed in
this paper (Baydoun and Willett, 1995; Gray, 1988).
This study analyses data from the period of 2009 to 2011, thus comprising three years of
accounting and financial information. The primary data for this paper were collected through
indirect observation, i.e., through the analysis of the answers of the questionnaire which was
applied to a sample of Portuguese owners and/or managers of SMEs. Studies related to corporate
financing usually use this questionnaire as a data collection instrument, along with the accounting
data (Antonczyk et al., 2010, 2011; Antonczyk & Salzmann, 2012, 2014; Hussain et al., 2006;
Jordan et al., 1998; Poker Junior et al., 2015).
The selection criteria narrowed down the scope of the study to 1629 national SMEs, from
which a total of 438 valid answers were obtained, thus resulting in a final sample that corresponds
to a response rate of 27%. The companies were grouped based on their reference sector segments,
namely: “Wholesale and Retail Trade”; “Repairs of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles”, “Manu-
facturing, Mining and Quarrying”, “Construction” and “Other Economic Activities”. It should
also be pointed out that the latter is the most representative one out of the first three.
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The dependent variable used in this study is the debt ratio, which represents a variable that
is recurring in literature on culture and the capital structure (Chui et al., 2002; Fairbairn, 2013;
Gleason et al., 2000; Hilgen, 2014; Li, Griffin, Yue, & Zhao, 2011; Rihab & Lofti, 2011). The
distinction of debts based on its cost, i.e., with or without costs, is supported by the literature on
the cultural values of conservatism and secrecy and by the theories related to the capital structure,
in that incurring debts with costs (such as bankruptcy costs – previously mentioned by Modigliani
& Miller, 1963) leads to a higher business risk. However, despite the existing theoretical support,
this variable is usually less empirically tested and, as such, there are very few examples of its
application (Jensen & Uhl, 2008).
Taking into account the bounded and fractional nature of the variable of interest (debt),
the regression analysis should be carried out using Papke and Wooldridge’s (1996) fractional
regression model, which, according to several authors, was specifically developed for modelling
proportions (e.g. Bastos & Ramalho, 2011; Cook, Kieschnick, & McCullough, 2008; Ramalho
& Silva, 2009). As such, if one chooses to use this variable, one must take into account its theory,
which is negatively associated with conservatism/risk aversion due to the increase in future costs
and, ceteris paribus, in financial risks (debts with costs create more future risks than debts without
costs).
Regarding the proposed independent variables, the explanatory factors that are usually selected
from studies on the identification of the corporate financing options in the context of SMEs were
taken into account, bearing in mind the studies on the association between corporate financing and
cultural values and the indicators that are usually used in studies on the capital structure. In the
latter case, relationships identified by the pecking order theory are preferred over relationships
identified by theories that rationalize the choices the owners and/or managers make, such as
relationships established in the context of the trade-off theory. On the one hand, relationships
identified by the pecking order theory are preferred due to the less rational criteria that underlie
the hierarchy of sources of financing. On the other hand, they are also preferred due to their
association with the cultural values of conservatism/risk aversion (a relationship identified by
Barton & Gordon, 1987).
Thus, based on the framework, this paper determined that the level of conservatism and secrecy
is negatively (positively) associated with the level of debt with (without) costs. The factor related
to the level of conservatism and secrecy used in this study is based on an index created from the
answers of the first question (Q1) of the questionnaire, with high levels for the Cronbach alpha
and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy of, respectively, 0.862 and 0.883. The
first question is related to conservatism and secrecy as described in the framework. The studies
carried out by Antonczyk et al. (2010, 2011), Antonczyk and Salzmann (2012), Chui et al. (2002),
Fairbairn (2013), Gleason et al. (2000), Hilgen (2014), Jensen and Uhl (2008), Poker Junior et al.
(2015), Rihab and Lofti (2011), Wang and Esqueda (2013, 2014) and Zheng et al. (2012) found
evidences that there is an inverse relationship between risk aversion and/or the level of secrecy
and the level of (total or long term) debt.
The level of conservatism and secrecy is determined using the answers of the second and third
questions, which are related to financing and to the business management process, respectively.
While the first question was more general (determined the level of conservatism and secrecy),
the next two questions were related specifically to the importance of certain factors that must
be taken into account when obtaining financing (question Q2, with a Cronbach alpha of 0.717),
alongside other factors related to business management (question Q3, with a Cronbach alpha of
0.837). Therefore, and since debts with costs are associated with a higher risk of bankruptcy due
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to the costs involved, it is expected that these factors will become associated with a lower level
of debt.
In this respect, this paper determined that companies that value and use financial information
the most (questions Q4,  with a Cronbach alpha of 0.846, and Q5, respectively) have a negative
(positive) relationship with the level of debt with (without) costs. According to Baydoun and
Willett (1995), conservatism is very important in the analysis of issues related to the quality
of the disclosed information, and is associated with physical characteristics such as objectivity,
verifiability, reliability, neutrality, and substance over form; secrecy, in turn, is associated with
characteristics related to the amount of information disclosed in the financial reports, such as
the presentation of aggregated or disaggregated information. Conservatism and secrecy are also
related to the analysis of the factors of accountability and to the analysis of the usefulness of the
decisions based on financial information (decision usefulness). In this context, conservatism and
secrecy are more often associated with the accounting systems of the countries whose accountancy
is closely related to taxation and, therefore, have less useful and less important characteristics for
decision making purposes. According to Gray (1988), Portugal is one of the countries with the
highest levels of conservatism and secrecy.
This paper determined that resorting to public and/or private equities as a financing option
(Q6) is negatively (positively) associated with the level of debt with (without) costs. The use
of venture capital reduces information asymmetries, and, therefore, it is very easy for the
company to reach an optimal capital structure due to a variety of instruments available. In
a multi-country study, Antonczyk and Salzmann (2012) used the dependent variable “ven-
ture capital” to determine the index of availability of this same variable for each country.
They also used independent variables such as cultural indexes of individualism and risk aver-
sion which were proposed by Hofstede (1980). Thus, a more specific question was included
that helped identify the companies that consider or have considered the possibility of resort-
ing to the above mentioned sources. This way one may determine if a company has a higher
or lower level of conservatism and secrecy (depending on the answer which may be affir-
mative or negative, respectively) and, consequently, a higher or lower level of debt with
costs.
This paper determined that companies where the owners are involved in its management (part),
identiﬁed in  question  A1.1, have a negative (positive) relationship with the level of debt with
(without) costs. According to Ang et al. (2000), Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen
(1983), agency costs are higher when the number of non-owner managers is higher. On the other
hand, professional managers are more concerned about results because their power does not derive
from the property itself; as such they adopt more aggressive growth strategies. In the same way
as with family businesses, it is suggested that risks associated with owner managers are higher
because they are responsible for not losing the company.
This paper also determined that companies mostly owned by non-family members (nfam),
identiﬁed in  question  A1.2, have a positive (negative) relationship with the level of debt with
(without) costs. According to Ang et al. (2000), companies owned by family members are
positively associated with the level of debt, thus meeting the expectations of the agency costs
theory. This is due to the fact that it is preferable to have an external debt rather than new part-
ners/shareholders in order to avoid the risk of bankruptcy. High levels of debt, as well as the risk
of default, encourage creditors to closely monitor the company (Ang et al., 2000). As such, in the
context of SMEs, more risk aversion and confidential attitudes can be expected, namely, due to
the fear of bankruptcy or of losing control (e.g. new people taking control).
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Lastly, based on the fiscal number, we were able to include other variables related to the studies
on capital structures, which are described below.
1. Maturity  (AGE)  is  negatively  associated  with  the  level  of  debt  with  (without)  costs.  The
variable “reputation” is generally associated with maturity because the age of the company is
usually used as the best proxy for identifying its notoriety. This association was highlighted
by Diamond (1989, 1991) in the light of the agency costs theory. For creditors, looking at the
company’s reputation is one way of ensuring that the company will stay in business and meet its
commitments, thus eliminating the effects of information asymmetry. For this reason, a positive
association between this variable and the level of debt can be expected. On the other hand,
according to Berger and Udell (1998), Petersen and Rajan (1994), based on either the pecking
order theory or the growth life cycle theory, more mature companies tend to accumulate results,
thus resorting to fewer external debts. In a more classical perspective, Myers and Majluf (1984)
present the same understanding on this theme. In a latest study, Mac an Bhaird and Lucey (2014)
have found precisely this negative association.
2. Non-debt  tax  shields  (NDTS)  are  negatively  (positively)  associated  with  the  level  of  debt
with (without)  costs.  The variable “Non-debt tax shields” is directly related to the theory of taxation
and bankruptcy costs initially proposed by Modigliani and Miller (1963) and later developed by
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980). According to this theory, tax savings (tax deductibility) that are
associated with the cost of the debt are considered beneficial up to the point where the results of
the company are able to absorb this effect. Due to excessive debts, companies are more likely to
ignore tax shields that do not result exclusively from debts. Thus, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980)
suggest that there is a negative association between this variable and debt because, even though
there are other tax shields that are not related to debts to choose from, it is preferable to obtain
these tax shields through this mechanism than to obtain a higher debt, which, in turn, may lead to
bankruptcy. This variable is supported by, and highlighted in, the trade-off theory (Myers, 1984).
According to this theory, companies with more non-debt tax shields tend to prefer debts without
costs, because they do not need tax shields that result from debts with costs, which are more likely
to lead to bankruptcy.
3. The  collateral  value  of  assets  (COL)  is  positively  associated  with  the  level  of  debt  with
(without) costs.  Studies on the association between this variable and debt have produced mixed
results. While some studies have shown that there is a negative association between this variable
and debt (Barton & Gordon, 1988; Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2001), other
studies have shown that there is a positive association between this variable and debt (Constand,
Osteryoung, & Nast, 1991; Frank & Goyal, 2003; Hilgen, 2014; Jordan et al., 1998; Rajan &
Zingales, 1995; Titman & Wessels, 1988; Wald, 1999). In the context of the effects of taxation on
capital structure, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) relate this variable to non-debt tax shields and,
therefore, establish a negative relationship with debt, because the company, by using these assets,
avoids the need to resort to debts as a way of obtaining tax shields (i.e., it limits the use of tax
shields associated with debts with costs). Conversely, Jensen and Meckling (1976) while taking
into account the agency costs theory, claim that using assets as security for liabilities limits the
extent to which the managers can use the free cash-flows that are intended for specific projects,
which makes companies incur debts and, thus, establish a positive relationship with debt. Myers
(1977) suggests that companies that invest more strongly in tangible fixed assets tend to incur
debts, because, in case of bankruptcy, it is easier for these assets to maintain their value. This
opinion was also supported by Scott (1976). Thus, the authors propose a positive relationship
between this variable and the level of debt, seeing as these companies bear even lower bankruptcy
costs than companies that invest more heavily in intangible assets (Myers, 1993). This positive
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relationship has also been strengthened in the context of information asymmetries, been mentioned
in several studies (Berger & Udell, 1998) and been supported by the pecking order theory.
4. Growth  (GRO)  is  positively  associated  with  the  level  of  debt  with  (without)  costs.  Stud-
ies that support the existence of a negative association between growth and debt are based on
the possibility of having underinvestment issues that are associated with high growth oppor-
tunities and that result in high agency costs. This opinion is also supported by Jensen and
Meckling (1976) and Stulz (1990) in the context of the agency costs theory. Although some
studies have identified a negative association between growth and debt (Barton & Gordon, 1988;
Kim & Sorensen, 1986; Rajan & Zingales, 1995), the positive association established in this
study also follows the developments that underlie the pecking order theory proposed by Myers
(1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984), in that it states that the company resorts to debts in order
to finance its growth (or the investment opportunities), when the ability to generate internal
resources (profitability) becomes insufficient. This positive association was empirically vali-
dated by Titman and Wessels (1988), Jordan et al. (1998) and Sogorb-Mira and Lopez-Gracia
(2003). According to the pecking order theory, the company shall only resort to debts if it can-
not be financed through its own resources or if such resources are insufficient to finance its
growth.
5. The  size  of  the  company  (SIZE)  is  positively  associated  with  the  level  of  debt  with  (without)
costs. There are some studies on the negative association between this variable and debt (Hall
et al., 2004; Kim & Sorensen, 1986; Titman & Wessels, 1988) but there is a much larger number
of studies on its positive association (Berger & Udell, 1998; Booth et al., 2001; Fama & French,
2002; Hall et al., 2004; Harris & Raviv, 1990; Jordan et al., 1998; Myers & Majluf, 1984; Myers,
1977, 1984; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Scott, 1976; Sogorb-Mira & Lopez-Gracia, 2003). The
studies on the positive association between this variable and debt determined that the size of the
company is somehow associated with the collateral value of assets: the larger the size, the more
guarantees it provides (Scott, 1976). This association was developed in the context of the trade-off
theory. In the context of the agency costs theory, Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that companies
that are larger and that have a more complex corporate structure and decision-making level have
a higher level of information. In turn, Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that large companies
have a lower risk of bankruptcy and are more likely to diversify their sources of financing. In
this respect, large companies are less exposed to information asymmetry and, thus, resort to more
diverse sources of financing. This diversification, in turn, is associated with the pecking order
theory (Myers, 1984).
6. Liquidity  (LIQ)  is  negatively  associated  with  the  level  of  debt  with  (without)  costs.  Although
there are many studies that use the variable “liquidity” in the analysis of the capital structure of
companies, this paper will only focus on the contributions of Antonczyk et al. (2010,2011), Chang
et al. (2012), Li et al. (2011) and Sogorb-Mira and Lopez-Gracia (2003). According to the pecking
order theory, if a company tends to resort to self-financing, it will also tend to maintain high levels
of liquidity in order to avoid resorting to debts (Myers & Majluf, 1984). This negative association
was identified by Sogorb-Mira and Lopez-Gracia (2003) in their study on SMEs in Spain.
7. Proﬁtability  (RET)  is  negatively  associated  with  the  level  of  debt  with  (without)  costs.
Theories related to asymmetric information support a positive association between profitability
and debt as a way of identifying which projects are profitable and which are not (Leland & Pyle,
1977; Ross, 1977). Likewise, the trade-off theory supports this positive association, seeing as
high levels of results lead to a better use of tax shields. Although some studies have identified
a positive association between profitability and debt (Barton & Gordon, 1988; Frank & Goyal,
2003), there has been more empirical evidence regarding negative associations in studies on
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capital structure (Booth et al., 2001; Hall et al., 2004; Jensen & Uhl, 2008; Jordan et al., 1998;
Lopez-Gracia & Aybar-Arias, 2000; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Titman & Wessels, 1988; Wald,
1999; Watson & Wilson, 2002). However, the negative association proposed in this study is in
line with the developments proposed in the pecking order theory by Myers (1984) and Myers and
Majluf (1984), in that the most profitable companies avoid resorting to debts more often. Hilgen
(2014), as an example of latest study on culture and capital structure, found a negative association
between profitability and debt.
8. The  risk  of  the  company  (RIS)  is  negatively  associated  with  the  level  of  debt  with  (without)
costs. It is very important to study this variable because it allows us to determine the influence of
the risk of the company from the creditors’ point of view, (instead of determining the owners and
managers’ greater or lesser risk-taking), which is the basis for determining the variables associated
with conservatism. There is no consensus on which variables should be used as proxy for risk or
how they are determined. Such variables are, for example, the standard deviation of the turnover,
the profitability of the assets and the use of a coefficient of variation of the turnover (Antonczyk
et al., 2010, 2011). Likewise, in literature, there is no consensus on whether the relationship
between this variable and debt is positive or negative. While some authors support the existence
of positive relationships (Kim & Sorensen, 1986; Myers, 1977; Toy, Stonehill, Remmers, Wright,
& Beekhuisen, 1974), other authors support the existence of negative relationships (Bradley,
Jarrell, & Kim, 1984; Chung, 1993; Frank & Goyal, 2003; Leland & Pyle, 1977).
9. The  sector  of  activity  (SEC)  is  positively  (negatively)  associated  with  the  level  of  debt  with
(without) costs,  depending  on  the  speciﬁc  characteristics  of  the  sectors  under  consideration.
This variable is usually used as a control variable and in association with theories related to the
capital structure. There are some examples of its use in the studies proposed by Ang et al. (2000),
Antonczyk et al. (2011), Chui et al. (2002), and Lopez-Gracia and Aybar-Arias (2000). In the
context of the literature on this subject, the sector of activity helps to explain why some sectors
generate high cash flows and, thus, avoid resorting to debts, (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990), and why,
in turn, other sectors have higher risks of bankruptcy (e.g. sectors related to technology) and,
thus, have greater difficulty in incurring debts (Myers, 1993). Harris and Raviv (1990, 1991) also
highlight the influence the sector has in determining the capital structure in specific contexts of
analysis, stating that companies in the same industry tend to have similar levels of debt. Likewise,
Myers (1984) determined that the nature of the related assets and risks varies depending on the
sector of activity.
Analysis  of  the  results
This section illustrates the application of the models of the determinants of the companies’
capital structure decisions to the empirical study.
Table 1 shows the results of the regressions based on the proposed (dependent) debt variables:
“debt with costs” and “debt without costs”.
The values of the coefficients are identified in Table 1, as well as the levels of significance
related to the relationship between the dependent and independent variables of the proposed
models. The model was estimated with a functional form of log–log type and heteroskedastic
robust standard errors. The variance inflation factor (VIF) values were used, which allows to
identify the level of the variance of an estimated regression coefficient that is increased for the
existence of multicollinearity. Those values ranged from 1.063 to 2.351, with 1.597 as its average.
This results expresses the absence of multicollinearity, considering that those figures are lower
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Table 1
Results of the regressions.
Debt with costs Debt without costs
Variable Coeff. t-Stat p-Value Variable Coeff. t-Stat p-Value
Q1 −0.007 −2.46 0.014 Q1 0.005 2.32 0.020
Q2 1 −0.034 −1.77 0.077 Q2 1 0.018 1.19 0.235
Q2 2 −0.015 −0.70 0.486 Q2 2 0.023 1.23 0.217
Q2 3 0.033 1.16 0.246 Q2 3 −0.036 −1.55 0.121
Q2 4 0.033 1.53 0.125 Q2 4 −0.013 −0.65 0.514
Q2 5 −0.001 −0.04 0.965 Q2 5 0.025 1.17 0.243
Q2 6 −0.001 −0.04 0.970 Q2 6 −0.017 −0.87 0.384
Q3 1 0.072 1.60 0.109 Q3 1 −0.010 −0.26 0.792
Q3 2 −0.072 −1.73 0.084 Q3 2 0.052 1.49 0.136
Q3 3 −0.021 −0.65 0.513 Q3 3 −0.028 −1.05 0.294
Q3 4 0.104 2.93 0.003 Q3 4 0.028 1.09 0.275
Q3 5 −0.022 −0.58 0.563 Q3 5 0.009 0.27 0.784
Q3 6 0.043 1.72 0.085 Q3 6 −0.046 −2.02 0.043
Q4 1 −0.028 −0.87 0.386 Q4 1 −0.006 −0.23 0.816
Q4 2 0.000 −0.01 0.992 Q4 2 0.043 1.67 0.096
Q4 3 −0.106 −3.37 0.001 Q4 3 −0.008 −0.27 0.786
Q4 4 0.026 0.88 0.378 Q4 4 −0.038 −1.46 0.144
Q4 5 0.041 1.59 0.112 Q4 5 −0.040 −1.80 0.072
Q4 6 0.032 1.23 0.219 Q4 6 0.012 0.53 0.593
Q5 0.007 0.25 0.806 Q5 −0.046 −1.74 0.081
Q6 0.004 0.08 0.939 Q6 −0.060 −1.41 0.159
part 0.060 0.87 0.386 part −0.046 −0.82 0.410
nfam −0.021 −0.46 0.649 nfam 0.053 1.32 0.186
AGE −0.005 −2.56 0.011 AGE −0.005 −3.45 0.001
NDTS 0.876 1.28 0.200 NDTS 1.127 1.69 0.092
COL 0.732 5.67 0.000 COL −0.603 −5.72 0.000
GRO −0.162 −1.14 0.255 GRO 0.278 1.98 0.047
SIZE 0.086 4.05 0.000 SIZE −0.079 −4.41 0.000
LIQ −1.023 −7.67 0.000 LIQ −0.193 −1.59 0.113
RET −0.745 −2.05 0.041 RET −0.594 −1.85 0.065
RIS 0.114 0.65 0.517 RIS −0.005 −0.05 0.964
sec2 0.024 0.50 0.614 sec2 −0.084 −2.23 0.026
sec3 0.063 0.97 0.330 sec3 −0.012 −0.21 0.835
sec4 0.048 0.90 0.367 sec4 0.018 0.29 0.770
const −1.688 −4.34 0.000 const 1.513 4.65 0.000
Source: Created by the authors.
than 10 or even than 5 as suggested by a significant number of authors (e.g. Bayrakdarog˘lu1, Ege,
& Yazıcı, 2013; Chechet & Olayiwola, 2014; Kariuki, 2014; Li & Harrison, 2008).
The values of the coefficients (coeff.) indicate the directions of the partial effects.
According to the initial estimate of the model, the level of conservatism and secrecy, which is
together determined using the answers for the first question, is negatively associated with debts
with costs and positively associated with debts without costs. These answers, which are related
to both management and corporate financing, can determine the values shown in these tables and
the level of conservatism and secrecy of each company.
The level of conservatism and secrecy is also determined using the answers of the second
and third questions, which are related to financing and to the business management process,
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respectively. This level is positively (negatively) associated with the level of debt with (without)
costs.
However, significant relationships between debt and conservatism/secrecy were not determined
from the evaluation of the variable that determines the possibility of resorting to the public and
private equity. Likewise, the variables related to the importance and use of financial information
are not significantly associated with debt.
The variables related to governance and ownership structures, i.e., the participation of the
owners in management offices and in family vs. non-family businesses are not related to debt.
The size and the collateral value of assets are significant in both cases (debt with costs and
debt without costs), but have opposite values. Thus, the proposed positive association was only
determined in the first case (debt with costs). This can be explained by the higher risk associ-
ated with debts with costs, which, from the financiers’ (borrowers) point of view, should lead
to an increased need for lenders to provide guarantees and information. In this respect, this
observation is also in line with the usual claims that the smaller the company, the more diffi-
cult it is to obtain bank financing, due to the level of guarantees provided and due to having
more information asymmetries, which are the factors that are inversely related to the size of the
company.
This explanation is somehow supported by both the trade-off theory and the pecking order
theory. Thus, larger companies that have a high collateral value of assets tend to have higher
levels of debt with costs (than smaller companies), because smaller companies that have a lower
collateral value of assets sometimes don’t have access to finance. It should also be noted that there
are some studies on capital structure that have already identified the negative relationship between
debt and the variables “size” and “collateral value of assets” (Barton & Gordon, 1988; Booth,
Aivazian, Dermirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2001; Kim & Sorensen, 1986; Titman & Wessels,
1988).
The initial estimate of the model as regards the maturity and profitability were found according
to the estimates of the pecking order theory or financial growth life cycle theory, having a negative
association with debt (with and without costs). The same evidence was identified by Hilgen (2014)
and Mac an Bhaird and Lucey (2014), for instance. Nonetheless, these previous mentioned authors
did not separate the types of debts in their analysis. Those results are inverse to the estimates of the
agency costs theory and of the trade-off theory, in which maturity and profitability, respectively,
are positively associated with debt (with and without costs).
However, no significant associations between growth (which is the basis of the pecking order
theory) and debt have been determined (that are in line with the results obtained by Jordan et al.
[1998] and Hall et al. [2004], except those regarding debt without costs, in which it is possible to
identify a positive association, following the initial estimate).
Likewise, liquidity and non-debt tax shields are only associated with one of the characteristics
of the debt that were analyzed in our study: debt with costs and debt without costs, respectively.
Liquidity is negatively associated with debts with costs, following the estimates of the pecking
order theory. Non-debt tax shields, which is a variable that was defined by the trade-off theory,
are positively associated with debts without costs, following the initial estimates. Bradley et al.
(1984) are some of the authors who have identified positive relationships between this variable
and debt.
However, in both cases, the results of these tables can be explained by the association between
debt and conservatism, which determines the lenders’ low propensity to risk. Thus, the existence
of a negative relationship between liquidity and debt with costs can be explained by the high risks
associated with this type of debt, seeing as it is unlikely that a company will resort to debts with
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cost if it has high liquidity. In turn, there is a positive relationship between non-debt tax shields
and debt without costs because it is unlikely that a company will resort to debts with costs if it has
high risks of bankruptcy. Pettit and Singer (1985) have a different view on this. They claim that
non-debt tax shields are not relevant to SMEs, because SMEs usually have low levels of results
and, therefore, it is not viable to use such tax shields. However, no association between risk and
debt (that is in line with the results obtained by Sogorb-Mira and Lopez-Gracia [2003] in the
context of the SMEs in Spain) has been determined.
Finally, the sectors of activity were not significantly associated with debt, conversely to the
results obtained by Hall et al. (2004). As an exception was identified a negative relationship
between the variable “sec2” (“Manufacturing, mining and quarrying” sector), and debt without
costs. In this respect, the effects of the sector as a whole were not sufficient to explain the corporate
financing options, conversely to those obtained by Hall et al. (2004).
Conclusions
According to Chui et al. (2002), there are numerous studies on cultural values, but not many
address the problem of culture in the context of corporate financing. In line with this understanding,
Chang et al. (2012) state that “in the past, the impact of national culture on financing decisions
was largely forgotten; today it is increasingly stressed in investigations”. Also Wang and Esqueda
(2014) corroborates that “very few studies have tested the theories of corporate financial leverage
across countries by accounting for national cultural characteristics. Even when not tested, some
recent studies have suggested the inclusion of the culture as an important aspect to be analyzed
(e.g. Zerriaa & Noubbigh, 2015).
The results obtained by Rihab and Lofti (2011) have led us to recommend that studies on debt
be carried out in every country. We suggest that cultural and cognitive factors be used in these
studies to explain the behaviour of each country towards the corporate financing options. For us,
not including social and cultural models in the studies that analyze the factors that determine the
capital structure is a major flaw. In turn, the results obtained by Antonczyk et al. (2011) have led
us to highlight the importance of including “cultural factors in the financial economy”. The same
perspective was emphasized by Hilgen (2014) who, using data from European retailers, states
that “even after controlling for both firm-specific and country-specific variables, the differences
between mean capital structures of the different cultural clusters are significant”. Poker Junior
et al. (2015), adapting the study developed by Chui et al. (2002), state the conservatism as “the
main cultural features to influence the capital structure”.
This paper shows that a significant number of managers and owners of Portuguese SMEs
support the relationships between the level of conservatism/secrecy and the corporate financing
options, in line with the statements that were previously identified in the literature (Chui et al.,
2002; Gleason et al., 2000; Hilgen, 2014; Kearney et al., 2012; Mac an Bhaird and Lucey, 2014;
Wang & Esqueda, 2013, 2014; Zheng et al., 2012). This study corroborates these results, in
the sense that if a company has high levels of conservatism and secrecy, it will tend to choose
corporate financing options that are associated with a lower risk, i.e., that are more conservative
(debt without costs).
The results of this questionnaire also show that SMEs that are hierarchized based on the
pecking order theory tend to prefer to resort to debts, in line with the more general statements
in the literature on this subject (Fairbairn, 2013; Hall et al., 2004; Jensen & Uhl, 2008; Lopez-
Gracia & Aybar-Arias, 2000; Mac an Bhaird & Lucey, 2014; Sogorb-Mira & Lopez-Gracia, 2003;
Watson & Wilson, 2002).
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This study is our contribution to literature on this subject, because it introduces cultural
variables that were obtained from a questionnaire and associates them with accounting and
finance variables. This association allows us to analyze the capital structure of the SMEs
from a point of view that is not widely used in the literature on this subject. Likewise, the
analysis of the debt, while taking into account its distinct characteristics (debt with costs
and debt without costs), seems to be widely overlooked in the literature, sometimes result-
ing in inconsistent conclusions that contribute to, according to Myers (1984), the “update
of the puzzle” which is associated with the need to understand the capital structure of the
companies.
The difficulty in obtaining empirical evidence of association between the proposed variables
and debt in the literature on this subject, depending on its characteristics, is probably the basis of
the existence of some results that are apparently inconsistent with the literature. Thus, it is expected
that the contribution presented in this paper will help to better understand the relationships
between corporate financing options, cultural values and the variables that underlie the modern
theories of corporate capital structure.
Annex  1.  Questionnaire
Note: All information collected in this questionnaire is strictly confidential. The data 
will  be sol ely  used  for statisti cal  pu rpo ses. The  re sults  extracted  fro m here will  be  pr esented  
in aggregate format. 
Please indicate your position in  this entity:  
(Manager and shareholder / Non-manager and shareholder)  
Please indicate your VAT number:  
(This information will allow us to get economic and financial information which is  not 
provided in this questionnaire) 
Part I: General information on the entity 
A1. Please indicate the shareholder structure (in %)  at  the end of  the year, based on  the 
type of shareholders and corporate relationships: 
A1.1 Type of shareholders:  
Managers:  
Non-managers: 
A1.2 Corporate relationships:   
Capital is at least 50% owned by familiar members (Yes / No): 
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1.2 The entry of new shareholders presents the  risk of   a  deviation of   the  enterprise 
lack the account into taking strategy, growth  originally project the of knowledge of 
conceived by initial entrepreneurs: 
1.3 The funding from current resources of shareholders of   the  entity  presents as   the 
main advantage the concealment of internal information to external entities: 
1.4 More important than the return on the resources invested by  current shareholders is 
to maintain the financial stability of the enterprise, so  that you can avoid opening the capital 
of the enterprise to third parties: 
1.5 In choosing among the possible sources of financing  available to   the  enterprise, 
should be   rejected  the  options  that  determine the disclosure to third  parties of   strategic 
information: 
1.6 The participation of shareholders in  the enterprise management  is  always beneficial 
to the extent that these elements represent the key stakeholders in the entity's performance:  
1.7 The risk of opening the capital of an  enterprise to  a third party is  directly related to 
the need to share information to persons or entities other than initial entrepreneurs: 
reflection the general in is stability 1.8 Financial  enterprise's the of stability the of 
shareholders and management: 
1.9 The information of strategic nature should be  known only to  the shareholders and 
managers, why should be avoided external funding sources which require the disclosure of 
this information: 
1.10 Diversification of sources of corporate financing presents more risks than benefits, 
involvement possible the to comes it when especially  enterprise the in others of 
management: 
1.11 The opening of the capital of an enterprise to  a third party, as  a possible source of 
funding, presents as downside the mandatory disclosure of a broader set of information: 
1.12 The trust relationship established between the shareholders is  critical to  the success 
of the enterprise, being even more important than the individual skills of each shareholder:  
Part II: Specific information on the management 
following the of each for opinion your indicate please below, scale Q1. Using the 
state ment s: 
543 2 1 
         5: strongly agree 1: strongly disagree 
1.1 The maintaining of confidentiality of enterprise strategic information can be ensured 
by the stability of the shareholders and boards of management:  
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1.14 The continuity of a society must be fundamentally guaranteed by the stability of 
the shareholders and boards of management:   
Q2. Using the scale below, please indicate the degree of importance to the following 
factors to be considered in the process of financing: 
543 2 1 
        5: more important 1: less important 
2.1 The maintenance of the control of the enterprise: 
2.2 The benefits and / or tax benefits associated:   
2.3 The borrowing costs: 
2.4 The disclosure requirements associated: 
2.5 The sharing of management decisions:  
2.6 The risk diversification: 
please scale, previous same Q3. Using the  the to importance of degree the indicate 
following aspects of business management: 
3.1 The image and reputation of the enterprise: 
3.2 Strategies that ensure the enterprise going concern: 
3.3 The minimization of business risks: 
3.4 The definition of politics of financing: 
3.5 Strategies that ensure growth:   
3.6 The decision making by other members: 
Q4. Using the scale below, please indicate the degree of utility that you attribute to the 
natures of financial information extracted from accounting: 
543 2 1 
        5: more useful 1: less useful 
1.13 In choosing among the available funding sources,  even more important than the 
cos t  of  financing   is  the  anal ysis  of  the  inv olvement  of  external   persons or   entitie s  in  the 
management decisions of the enterprise: 
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4.1 Information from balance-sheet:  
4.2 Information from income statement: 
4.3 Other financial information (e.g.: notes): 
4.4 Information from statement of changes in equity: 
4.5 Information from cash-flow statement: 
4.6 Financial information other than financial statements: 
Q5. Using the same previous scale, please indicate the degree of utility that you attribute 
to the accounting information: 
 Q6. Have you ever considered the possibility  of  using funding sources based on  public 
or private equity? (Yes/No): 
Thank you for your valuable contribution to this research! 
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